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In this paper, I describe and analyze the phenomenon of informal development collaboration 
between firms in the field of embedded Linux, a type of open source software. To explain the 
observed phenomenon of voluntary revealing, I develop a duopoly model of quality competition. 
The central assumptions are that firms require two complementary technologies as inputs, and differ 
with respect to the relative importance they attach to these technologies. The main results are, first, 
that a regime with compulsory revealing can lead not only to higher profits, but also to higher 
product qualities than a proprietary regime. Second, when the decision to reveal is endogenized 
equilibria arise with voluntary revealing by both players. 
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There is a long-standing debate on what the ideal incentive system for innovation would
be. The recent surge of open source software (OSS) has added new aspects to this debate.
Open source licenses do not allow royalties to be charged, and every user of the software
is entitled to obtain, to modify and to redistribute the source code (Open Source Initia-
tive 2003). Hence, options for both appropriation and protection of open-source-related
innovations are restricted, and one would correspondingly expect reduced incentives to
innovate. Nonetheless, commercial ﬁrms undertake many and in some cases large contri-
butions to such software (e.g., Moody 2001).
A particularly interesting case of commercial OSS development is that of “embedded
Linux”. The term denotes variants of the operating system Linux that are used in “em-
bedded devices” such as VCRs and machine controls. Embedded Linux is unusual in that
most established motives for commercial ﬁrms to contribute to OSS do not apply. Still,
empirical evidence presented in Section 2 shows that ﬁrms developing embedded Linux do
disclose considerable amounts of their code (Henkel 2005). They do so mainly in order to
elicit informal development support from other ﬁrms—in particular their competitors—
and indeed receive such support. In this context it is important to note that, even though
embedded Linux comes under an OSS license, ﬁrms do have considerable latitude with
respect to revealing their code or keeping it secret.
To explain this informal collaboration I propose a mechanism hitherto not described
in the literature. It rests upon complementarity between technologies and heterogeneity
between ﬁrms’ technology needs. It is dubbed the “jukebox mode of innovation”—an
analogy to heterogeneous tastes of music-lovers who feed a jukebox. I develop a duopoly
model of quality competition in which the above characteristics interact to enable collab-
oration. The central assumptions of the model are deduced from empirical ﬁndings and
supported by quotes from expert interviews (Henkel 2003).
I ﬁnd that when revealing is compulsory, an equilibrium with each ﬁrm specializing in
the development of one technology exists for most parameter values considered. In this
equilibrium, each ﬁrm adopts its competitor’s developments. Central results then are the
following. First, for medium to high levels of heterogeneity and low to medium intensity
of competition not only ﬁrm proﬁts, but also product qualities are higher under the open
regime than under the proprietary regime. While larger proﬁts are not too surprising due
to cost savings under the open regime, superior product qualities are surprising (cf., on
1spillovers in cost-reducing R&D, Spence 1984): Given the positive externality that ﬁrm
A’s investment in product quality has on its competitor, one would have expected a lower
marginal return to quality improvements than under the proprietary regime, and hence
a lower equilibrium quality. The second main result is that, when the choice between
revealing and secrecy is endogenized the advantages of informal collaboration are not lost
in a prisoner’s dilemma. This is the case, e.g., in the model devised by Eaton & Eswaran
(1997), who obtain technology sharing as an equilibrium only in a repeated game. Here,
in contrast, equilibria with both ﬁrms opting to reveal exist in a one-shot game.
The “jukebox mode of innovation” present in embedded Linux is highly relevant for the
embedded systems industry. This industry is huge—of 6.2 billion processors manufactured
in 2002 more than 98% went into embedded systems (Ganssle & Barr 2003). Of these,
a considerable share is running embedded Linux since, according to a survey by VDC
(2004), it is one of the three most widely used operating systems in this ﬁeld. Hence,
studying the development mode of embedded Linux not only reveals a new mechanism
of informal collaboration, but also helps to better understand a large and fast-growing
industry. Furthermore, the model is applicable to other instances of OSS development
where ﬁrms’ technology needs are heterogeneous, technologies are complementary, and
competition is not too strong. Examples are most middleware software packages, in
particular the Apache webserver software (Franke & von Hippel 2003). Since revealing in
my model is voluntary, not forced by the OSS license, the model should also be applicable
to non-OSS software, as will be discussed in Section 6.
The mechanism I analyze is related to, but diﬀerent from other instances of voluntary
revealing of innovations. Allen (1983), in his study of 19th century iron production in
England, describes situations of “collective invention” in which ﬁrms revealed details on
improvements of their furnaces (see also Cowan & Jonard (2003) and Nuvolari (2004)).
In Allen’s words, collective invention “diﬀers from R&D since the ﬁrms did not allocate
resources to invention—the new technical knowledge was a by-product of normal business
operation” (Allen 1983, p. 2). Thus, the ﬁrms were users of their innovations; furthermore,
they had largely homogeneous technology needs. This is also true for those instances of
OSS development that have been likened to collective invention by Meyer (2003), Nuvolari
(2001), and Osterloh & Rota (2004). In contrast, I analyze a situation where ﬁrms do
allocate resources to R&D, where they beneﬁt from their innovations by selling them, and
where heterogeneity of technology needs plays a central role.
Under certain conditions, free revealing might be favored by sequentiality of the innova-
tion process. Bessen & Maskin (2000) present a duopoly model in which ﬁrms’ innovative
2steps are sequential and complementary to each other, and show that the availability
of patent protection can be an impediment to innovation. The situation they analyze
is somewhat similar to the one observed in the ﬁeld of embedded Linux, but diﬀers in
important points. Heterogeneity of technology needs does not play a role in their model,
and innovative steps are sequential rather than simultaneous. Furthermore, the deci-
sion to reveal is not endogenized. Harhoﬀ, Henkel & von Hippel (2003) model a mix
of user innovation—voluntarily made public—and subsequent, complementary manufac-
turer innovation. These authors do consider complementarity between technologies and
heterogeneity in technology needs. Still, their results do not explain the phenomena under
study in this paper since, in their model, complementary innovation is performed by a
supplier, not by a competitor.
Fershtman & Kamien (1992) analyze under what conditions ﬁrms requiring two com-
plementary technologies for their products would be willing to engage in cross-licensing
instead of developing both technologies in-house. The situation they look at is thus quite
similar to that under study in this paper. However, when collaboration in the form of
cross-licensing arises in their model it is contract-based, while informal collaboration with-
out contractual obligation is precisely what this paper focuses on. Beyond that, also
heterogeneity of needs does not play a role in their model.
Complementarity is the driving force also behind the concept of “absorptive capacity”
introduced by Cohen & Levinthal (1990). The term refers to knowledge and skills that
enable a ﬁrm to beneﬁt from incoming knowledge spillovers, and for its build-up typically
requires internal R&D. Wiethaus (2005) shows that ﬁrms might choose identical broad
R&D approaches when spillovers are large, since the latter can best be exploited with an
absorptive capacity based on the same R&D approach. His results apply to embedded
Linux insofar as choosing Linux over alternative operating systems enables a ﬁrm to
beneﬁt from incoming spill-overs from other ﬁrms working on this software. However,
Wiethaus’ model does not address how ﬁrms behave given heterogeneity of technology
needs within embedded Linux. In contrast to Wiethaus (2005), Kamien & Zang (2000)
and Gerlach, Rønde & Stahl (2005) argue that larger spillovers will make competing ﬁrms
pursue ﬁrm-speciﬁc approaches, since then outgoing knowledge ﬂows do not beneﬁt the
competitor. Also these models provide only limited insights into the phenomena observed
in the ﬁeld of embedded Linux. Here, technological heterogeneity is given by the diversity
of applications of embedded Linux (as opposed to emerging endogenously from the model),
while outgoing spillovers are endogenous.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present empirical
3evidence on the informal development collaboration observed in embedded Linux. The
model set-up is deﬁned in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results from the model analysis.
Section 5 links these results to empirical observations and discusses model assumptions.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 Informal collaboration in Embedded Linux
This paper is motivated by a qualitative empirical study (Henkel 2003) and a large-scale
survey (Henkel 2005) of embedded Linux. This term denotes variants of the Linux operat-
ing system that are in one way or another adapted to embedded devices. Correspondingly,
“developing embedded Linux” refers to the development of various modules or extensions
that make Linux suitable for embedded systems. Examples are the RTAI real-time module
(“Real-Time Application Interface”), the toolkit busybox, the “shrunk” C library uclibc,
and architecture-speciﬁc code for processors used in embedded devices. While all vari-
ants of Linux largely share the same code base, modules such as those mentioned above
diﬀerentiate embedded from standard Linux.
Unlike general-purpose devices such as PCs, embedded devices are built for a speciﬁc
purpose. Examples are mobile phones, VCRs, machine controls and power plants. Market
analysis as well as everyday experience show that embedded devices are becoming ever
more widespread (Balacco & Lanfear 2002). Their ﬁelds of application are extremely het-
erogeneous, which entails a large diversity of hardware and software. Embedded software
may have to fulﬁll particular requirements with respect to stability, real-time capability,
and low memory needs. This heterogeneity has led to high industry fragmentation in
the ﬁeld of embedded operating systems. Adaptation of existing operating systems to
individual needs is common, and even in-house development by device manufacturers is
still rather widespread.
Such in-house development has, in recent years, become less attractive due to increas-
ing complexity of embedded devices (Webb 2002). This is one of the reasons why, as an
alternative to licensing a proprietary embedded operating system, embedding Linux has
emerged as an attractive option. Linux is a fully-ﬂedged, stable, and well maintained
operating system. Due to its modularity (cf. Baldwin & Clark 2003) and its being open
source software, it is well suited for adaptation to individual needs and is by now widely
used in embedded systems (Lombardo 2001, Balacco & Lanfear 2002, Webb 2003, VDC
2004). Its development is driven by specialized software ﬁrms (e.g., FSMLabs, Lynux-
4Works, MontaVista, and TimeSys in the US and Denx Software, Emlix, Mind and Sysgo
in Europe), board vendors (e.g., Hitachi, Intel, and Motorola), and device manufacturers
(e.g., Philips, Sharp, and Siemens) (Henkel 2003).
The commitment of commercial ﬁrms to embedded Linux may seem surprising, given
that Linux is licensed under the General Public License (GPL). This license requires
that all further developments based on the respective software be themselves licensed
under the GPL (Free Software Foundation 1991). This implies that by the time a device
running embedded Linux comes onto the market, the source code of the speciﬁc version of
embedded Linux it contains must be made available to all buyers. If a device is sold to the
mass market this implies that the code is all but publicly available—and competitors can
freely use it. Yet, considerable latitude with respect to revealing code does exist. A ﬁrm
can choose to be extremely “open” by making its code available to the public right after
development. Alternatively (and in accordance with the GPL), it can give the code only to
(possibly few) paying customers, and only when the device comes to market. Such delay
aﬀords considerable protection given the fast pace of the embedded systems market and
the fact that lead time is generally considered a quite eﬀective means of protection (e.g.,
Sattler 2003). Furthermore, it is accepted (if disputed) practice to make drivers (speciﬁc
software modules that link the operating system to hardware components) available only
as loadable binary modules, not as source code (Marti 2002).
The above means of protection are indeed widely used, but selectively: very often,
ﬁrms forgo available protection and voluntarily reveal their code (Henkel 2005). Among
the motives to do so, those related to external development support rank highly. The
statement “...because other developers make bugﬁxes and reveal them” received agreement
from 69.7% of respondents, disagreement from 11.5% (N = 134).2 For the statement,
“...because others develop the code further and reveal their developments in turn” 67.9% of
responses were positive, 14.2% negative. For dedicated software ﬁrms, also motives related
to marketing are important. However, most other motives suggested in the literature on
commercial OSS development do not apply.3
2Survey participants were oﬀered twelve motives of why their ﬁrm contributes code to public OSS
projects, and were asked to indicate their level of agreement on a 5-point scale ranging from “strongly
disagree” to “strongly agree”.
3Garnering development support from hobby programmers (Baake & Wichmann 2003, Dahlander &
Magnusson 2005) can be ruled out as a motive since embedded Linux is nearly exclusively developed by
ﬁrms. Standard setting, IBM’s explicit goal in its support of Linux as a server operating system (Moody
2001, p. 292), is not an issue for most ﬁrms engaging in embedded Linux, which basically require a reliable
operating system for their devices. Also the motive to increase demand for a complement to the software
can largely be ruled out: Embedded Linux code is a built-in part of their devices for hardware ﬁrms, and
5As argued above, there is high heterogeneity between ﬁrms’ technology needs in the ﬁeld
of embedded Linux. For informal development collaboration, this has two implications.
First, heterogeneity limits the negative competitive eﬀects of free revealing, as illustrated
by Quote (1) below.4 Since the software is to some degree speciﬁc to the respective device,
it is of lower value to competitors who can in most cases not use it without modiﬁcation
(Quote 2). Second, heterogeneity prevents a waiting game since it is unlikely that some-
one else will reveal the exact piece of software that a ﬁrm requires at a certain point in
time (Quote 3).5 Despite heterogeneous technology needs, once a speciﬁc development
has been made public other ﬁrms might ﬁnd it useful as a basis for further developments
(Quotes 4, 5). In particular, since it adds to the overall quality of embedded Linux, a
revealed improvement to one technology may make it worthwhile for some other agent to
develop another technology further (Quote 5). Hence, there is complementarity between
the various technologies that make up embedded Linux. For example, improving the net-
working capabilities makes more sense the better the real-time features of the operating
system. These two aspects—heterogeneity in technology needs and complementarity be-
tween individual technologies—are at the center of the model developed in the following
section.
(1) “When you look at it closely you ﬁnd that many [ﬁrms] pursue somewhat diﬀerent
goals. In RTAI [Real-Time Application Interface] they are no real competitors, even
though that can happen now and then.” (Software vendor, EU)
(2) “The embedded market is so extremely fragmented that no solution ﬁts all needs.
That is, the demand for speciﬁc adaptations is enormous.” (Device manufacturer,
EU)
(3) “We’re very much customer-driven. If the customer needs something and it’s
not available in the open source, we’ll just do it. And we’re not going to wait
for somebody else to do it. I think everybody else sees that about the same way.”
(Software vendor, US)
the core product for dedicated software ﬁrms. While signaling technical prowess (Lerner & Tirole 2002)
is, to some degree, a motive for software ﬁrms to reveal code, it falls short of explaining contributions
by hardware manufacturers. Finally, ﬁrms that develop OSS as users (Franke & von Hippel 2003, von
Hippel 2001) will typically be more willing to reveal it than ﬁrms selling their code (Henkel & von Hippel
2005). However, ﬁrms active in embedded Linux belong to the second category.
4Quotes are taken from 30 interviews conducted by the author in 2002 and 2003 (Henkel 2003).
5Heterogeneity of needs also plays a central role in the models of OSS development devised by Bessen
(2001) and Johnson (2001). However, heterogeneity works in a diﬀerent way in these approaches than in
the present one.
6(4) “There are some people out there who do work in an area that we take advantage
of, and take advantage of our work.” (Software vendor, US)
(5) “Usually [the further development of embedded Linux] is not considered to be a
joint eﬀort in the case of the embedded Linux vendors [...], it is more of a lever-
aging of other works to ﬁt a market niche, so they are done somewhat isolated yet
leveraged.” (Software vendor, US)
The situation described is similar to that of a bar where several patrons feed the juke-
box. In this metaphor, the overall operating system, made up of modules from various
contributors, corresponds to a whole night of music at the bar, made up of individual
pieces of music. Each person feeding the jukebox wishes to hear a particular song that is
unlikely to be chosen by someone else. Still, all others also beneﬁt from the music. Thus,
the public goods problem is overcome by heterogeneity in taste. Due to this analogy, the
innovation mechanism explored in this paper is dubbed the “jukebox mode of innovation”.
3 Model set-up
I develop a duopoly game in which ﬁrms A and B compete in the quality of their products.
Each ﬁrm oﬀers one product, each of which requires two technologies (T1 and T2) as
input. One can think of these technologies as modules that each ﬁrm adds on top of
the common and publicly available code base of embedded Linux. This common code
base does not appear in the model. The ﬁrms’ technology levels in technologies T1 and
T2 are denoted by qXi, where X ∈ {A,B}, i ∈ {1,2}. In order to attain technology
level qAi ﬁrm A can bear the corresponding development cost to attain the “development
level” dAi = qAi. Alternatively, if B has developed and revealed dBi, A can adopt B’s
development at no cost, yielding qAi = qBi = dBi and dAi = 0 (see below for the game’s
timing structure). I assume that a technology can only either be completely adopted or
be completely developed in-house.6
The proﬁt functions are ΠA(qA1,qA2,qB1,qB2) and ΠB(qA1,qA2,qB1,qB2).7 They are
6This assumption is justiﬁed for developments that have to be done “in one go”. That is, they can
not be broken up in sub-modules or in consecutive steps that each lead to a useable piece of software.
7More precisely, ΠX also depends on the development levels dX1 and dX2. Hence, in order to account
correctly for development cost the proﬁt functions should carry as additional arguments two dummy
variables indicating if technology i is developed in-house or adopted from the competitor. However, in
order to avoid overly burdensome notation I do not make these dependencies explicit. Instead, I will
point out when the cost part of the proﬁt function is modiﬁed due to spill-overs from the competitor.
7parameterized by three parameters a, b, and c, modeling homogeneity of technology needs
(a), complementarity between technologies T1 and T2 (b), and the intensity of competition
(c). These parameters will explicitly appear in the concrete functional form of ΠX to be
deﬁned below (see equations (1) to (3)). I make the following assumptions:
(1) Symmetry: ΠA = ΠB when qA1 = qB2, qA2 = qB1. That is, T1 plays the same role
for ﬁrm A as T2 does for ﬁrm B, and T2 for ﬁrm A corresponds to T1 for ﬁrm B.
(2) The proﬁt function can be split into a revenue function R and a cost function
K which is separable: ΠA(qA1,qA2,qB1,qB2) = RA(qA1,qA2,qB1,qB2) − KA1(qA1) −
KA2(qA2) (if A develops both T1 and T2 in-house).
(3) Concavity: ∂2ΠA/∂q2
Ai < 0 for i = 1,2.
(4) The mixed partial derivatives vanish: ∂2ΠA/∂qAi∂qBj ≡ 0 for i,j = 1,2 (note that
one derivative is with respect to A’s technology level qAi, the other one with respect
to B’s technology level qBj).
(5) Revenues increase in the respective ﬁrm’s technology levels: ∂RX/∂qXi > 0. Rev-
enues vanish when technology levels are zero: RA(0,0,qB1,qB2) = 0.
(6) a ∈ [0,1] measures the degree of homogeneity in technology needs. Homogeneous
technology needs are modeled by a = 1. If a < 1, then technology T1 is more
important for A than T2, and vice versa for B. For ΠA: for qA1 = qA2 ∧ qB1 = qB2,
∂ΠA/∂qA1 = ∂ΠA/∂qA2 if a = 1, and ∂ΠA/∂qA1 > ∂ΠA/∂qA2 if a < 1. Furthermore,
if a = 0 then ∂ΠA/∂qA2 = 0 and RA(0,qA2,qB1,qB2) = 0.
(7) b ≥ 0 models the degree of complementarity between T1 and T2. For b = 0, there
is no complementarity (∂2ΠA/∂qA1∂qA2 ≡ 0), while ∂2ΠA/∂qA1∂qA2 > 0 for b > 0.
(8) c ≥ 0 parameterizes the intensity of competition. For c = 0, competitive pressure
vanishes (∂ΠA/∂qB1 ≡ ∂ΠA/∂qB2 ≡ 0), while ∂ΠA/∂qBi < 0 (i = 1,2) for c > 0.
Assumptions 1 through 4 are made to simplify the analysis. Assumption 5 is obvi-
ous. Assumptions 6 through 8 deﬁne how the central characteristics of the model are
implemented in the proﬁt functions.
As to the game’s timing structure, I analyze a three-stage and a four-stage simultaneous-
move game. In the three-stage game, ﬁrms decide about entering the market, then choose
8the technologies they will develop (none, 1, 2, or both), and ﬁnally determine the devel-
opment levels for the chosen technologies. I compare a “proprietary” regime where all
developments are kept secret to an “open” regime where revealing is compulsory. The
latter can be interpreted as an idealized type of OSS development where no latitude exists
with respect to keeping innovations secret. In the four-stage game, revealing is endoge-
nized. After the market-entry decisions, in the newly introduced stage two, ﬁrms have to
commit either to revealing their developments or to keeping them secret. This timing is
motivated by the observation that ﬁrms tend to have long-term strategies with respect to
revealing their code, which are based on a ﬁrm’s relationship to the open source commu-
nity, on its culture, and on its employees and their attitudes. All of these characteristics
can not easily be changed in the short term. A similar timing structure underlies the
model by Baake & Wichmann (2003).
The restriction to only two possible actions—full revealing and complete secrecy—is a
simpliﬁcation made for purposes of the analysis. In reality, ﬁrms might reveal some of
their developments and hold back others. All actions are observable, such that there is
full information. The equilibrium concept employed is subgame perfection (Selten 1965).
The model formulation laid out above will be used to derive general results in Section
4.1. In 4.2, I will employ a concrete functional form for the proﬁt functions in order to
pursue the analysis in more detail. In this functional form, the ﬁrms’ product qualities as
functions of their technology levels are deﬁned as
QA = qA1 + aqA2 + bqA1qA2 , QB = aqB1 + qB2 + bqB1qB2 . (1)




The quadratic form of the cost function models capacity restrictions. An additional linear
term would make sense, but is omitted in order to keep the analysis tractable. Its absence
implies that developing each technology to at least some small level is always preferable
to doing without it. This assumption does not restrict the model’s generality too much.
Competition takes place in product qualities QA, QB. Buyers’ utility as well as price
8The fact that the cost term does not carry a coeﬃcient does not constitute a restriction of generality,
since by re-scaling technology levels and proﬁts a coeﬃcient β in the cost term can be scaled to ˜ β = 1.
9setting are not made explicit in order to keep the model tractable. Proﬁts are deﬁned as
ΠA = QA − cQB − KA , ΠB = QB − cQA − KB . (3)
Before I proceed with the model, it may be important to comment on the two parameters
a and c. It is plausible that ﬁrms with very similar technology needs (high a) will often
also have similar market oﬀerings, and hence face stronger competition (high c) for lack
of diﬀerentiation. In the real world, a and c will thus be positively correlated. However,
this does not mean that they can not vary independently. For example, in a growing
market where ﬁrms face capacity restrictions, competition can be weak despite identical
technologies and market oﬀerings. In contrast, ﬁrms using diﬀerent technologies can
compete strongly with each other, in particular when buyers have to decide not only
between sellers but also between technologies. It is thus justiﬁed to treat a and c as
independent parameters.
4 Results
4.1 General proﬁt functions
For a general proﬁt function the game can not be solved completely. This is simply due
to the fact that, e.g., high ﬁxed cost of market entry may lead to “no entry” by both
players being the only equilibrium of the overall game. However, assuming that market
entry has taken place, the following central results can be proved.
Proposition 1 Assume that assumptions (1) to (8) hold, that b > 0 (complementarity),
and that a < 1 (heterogeneous technology needs). Then the following holds.
(i) There exists an intensity of competition ¯ c > 0 such that for all c ∈ [0,¯ c[ equilibrium
technology levels and product qualities are higher under the open regime with each ﬁrm
developing only its respective more important technology than under the proprietary regime
with each ﬁrm developing both technologies.9
9In Propositions 1 to 3, I have to assume that, in the open regime, each ﬁrm chooses to develop
its respective more important technology. While it is extremely plausible that the players behave this
way, in can not be proved to be an equilibrium action without further assumptions. If, e.g., the cost
function KA1 contains a very large ﬁxed component then it will make sense for A to deviate from the
action “develop T1” to “develop no technology” (and still adopt T2 from B). Even if this means strongly
10(ii) Without complementarity (b = 0), equilibrium technology levels of the respective more
important technology (T1 for A, T2 for B) are, for c > 0, always lower under the open
then under the proprietary regime.
The intuition behind this result (proved in Appendix A.1) is the following. Due to
heterogeneity, B develops T2 to a higher level than A does. Under the open regime,
A beneﬁts from this increased technology level and, due to complementarity between
technologies T1 and T2, invests itself more into developing T1. This increased investment
will not take place when technologies are not complementary, as is underlined by part (ii)
of the proposition. The negative incentive eﬀect resulting, under the open regime, from
spill-overs to the competitor is limited due to low intensity of competition.
Higher technology levels lead to higher revenues, but also to higher cost. On the other
hand, cost saving are realized under the open regime since parallel developments are
avoided. The following proposition (proved in Appendix A.2) shows that, under suitable
circumstances, the net eﬀect on proﬁts is positive.
Proposition 2 Under the assumptions made in Proposition 1, there exists an intensity
of competition ˜ c > 0, ˜ c ≤ ¯ c, such that for all c ∈ [0,˜ c[ equilibrium proﬁts are higher under
the open regime than under the proprietary regime.
This proposition suggests a welfare comparison of the two regimes. However, without
further assumptions one can not prove the (apparent) superiority of the open regime (for
c < ˜ c): while ﬁrm proﬁts are higher and product qualities superior, ﬁrms might sell their
improved goods at such increased prices that higher deadweight-loss on the consumer side
vitiates the above gains. Still, welfare superiority of the open regime is highly plausible.
In any case, considering only the ﬁrm side the open regime’s equilibrium is clearly
Pareto superior. However, when the decision to reveal is endogenized in a four-stage
game, the reduced game in which ﬁrms choose between open and proprietary behavior
might exhibit the structure of a prisoner’s dilemma. The following proposition, proved in
Appendix A.3, shows that, under suitable conditions, this is not the case: revealing by
both ﬁrms can obtain endogenously.
reduced revenues (since T2 is relatively less important for A), it may mean increased proﬁts. However, it
will be shown in Section 4.2 that, for the speciﬁc proﬁt function, each ﬁrm focusing on its more important
technology is a subgame equilibrium for all parameter values.
11Proposition 3 Under the assumptions made in Proposition 1, there exists a degree of
homogeneity ˆ a > 0 and an intensity of competition ˆ c > 0, ˆ c ≤ ¯ c, such that for all a ∈ [0,ˆ a[
and all c ∈ [0,ˆ c[ a symmetric subgame equilibrium exists in stage 2 of the four-stage game
(after both haven chosen to enter the market) in which both ﬁrms choose “revealing”.
4.2 Speciﬁc proﬁt function
In order to illustrate the general results from the preceding section, I will in the following
employ the speciﬁc proﬁt function introduced in equations (1) to (3). Since retaining the
parameter b (measuring the strength of complementarity) explicitly renders the equations
rather complex, I set b = 1 and will discuss a variation of b qualitatively in Section 5.
Setting b = 1 does not restrict applicability of the propositions derived above since only
the property b > 0 was used.
Proprietary regime
Proposition 4 Under the proprietary regime, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in
which both ﬁrms enter the market if
c ≤ cb(a) := 3
1 + a + a2
8 + 11a + 8a2 . (4)
See Figure 1. In this equilibrium, ﬁrms choose the development levels
dA1 = dB2 = (2 + a)/3 , dA2 = dB1 = (1 + 2a)/3 , (5)
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− c
8 + 11a + 8a2
9
(duop.) . (6)
For c > cb(a), there are two equilibria with only one of the ﬁrms entering the market.10
Development levels are the same as in the duopoly case.
10These are equilibria in pure strategies. Equilibria where in the ﬁrst stage mixed strategies are played












Figure 1: Proprietary regime: Areas of diﬀerent equilibria (duopoly,
monopoly) in parameter space (a,c). Border curve described by cb(a).
Open regime
Under the open regime, the stage-two decisions on what technology to develop are no
longer trivial: no development, development of the respective more important technology,
and development of both technologies are all potentially sensible options.11 The calcula-
tion of development levels in the ﬁnal-stage subgame equilibria is presented in Appendix
A.4. The resulting payoﬀs allow to reduce the stage-two subgame, assuming market entry
by both ﬁrms, to a matrix game as shown in Table 3 in the Appendix. Concerning the
equilibria of this subgame, the following proposition holds (proof: see Appendix A.5):
Proposition 5 When, under the open regime, both ﬁrms have entered the market, then
the second-stage subgame has the following equilibria:
(i) Development of only the respective more important technology by each ﬁrm is a sub-
game equilibrium for all parameter values.
(ii) Development of both technologies by one ﬁrm and free riding by the other ﬁrm (asym-
metric equilibrium) is a subgame equilibrium in a segment of the parameter space as shown
in Figure 2 and deﬁned by equations (23) and (24) in the Appendix.
The above solution of the second-stage subgame allows the reduction of the entire game
to a 2×2 matrix game. For this reduction, an assumption is required on which subgame
11For simplicity, I exclude the case that a ﬁrm chooses to develop only the one technology which is less
important for its product quality. While an equilibrium with A developing technology 2 and B developing
technology 1 does arise for low heterogeneity of technology needs, it is plausible that ﬁrms can coordinate











symmetric and asymmetric equ.
symmetric equ.
Figure 2: Open regime: Types of second-stage subgame equilibria in (a,c)-
parameter space after market entry by both ﬁrms.
equilibrium obtains when the second-stage subgame has multiple equilibria. Since the
central question of this paper is under which conditions symmetric equilibria with informal
division of labor exist, I focus on the symmetric equilibria. Under this assumption, payoﬀs
for ﬁrm A in the second-stage subgame equilibrium as a function of market entry decisions





     
     
1 + a + a2
3
if B does not enter
(1 − ac)(1 + a − c − c2)
(1 + c)2 if B enters
(7)
Proposition 6 (i) Under the open regime, a symmetric duopoly equilibrium exists if
a ≥ c
2 + c − 1 . (8)
In this equilibrium, each ﬁrm develops only the respective more important technology and
adopts the other technology from its competitor (see Figure 3).
(ii) For a < c2 + c − 1, no duopoly equilibrium exists.
Hence, in a large part of the parameter space an equilibrium with informal division of
labor between the ﬁrms exists. In contrast, a monopoly equilibrium arises when compe-
tition is strong, which is intuitive. In addition, high heterogeneity in technology needs














Figure 3: Open regime: Areas of diﬀerent equilibria (duopoly, monopoly) in
parameter space (a,c). Border curve described by equation (8).
competitor’s developments are lower.
Comparison of proprietary and open regimes
The following proposition, proved in Appendix A.6, corresponds to Propositions 1 and
2 for the general case.
Proposition 7 (i) A duopoly exists under the proprietary regime only for low intensity
of competition (area X in Figure 4a), while under the open regime it exists in most parts
of the parameter space (areas X, Y).
(ii) Duopoly proﬁts under the open regime are higher than under the proprietary regime
(applies to area X).
(iii) For strong heterogeneity in technology needs and/or low intensity of competition,
equilibrium product qualities are higher under the open regime than under the proprietary
regime (see Figure 4b).
Endogenous choice between revealing and secrecy
In order to solve the four-stage game by backward induction, each ﬁnal-stage subgame
equilibrium needs to be determined. Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix A.7 show the actions
and payoﬀs, respectively, in the ﬁnal-stage subgame when only ﬁrm A has chosen to
reveal. The ﬁnal-stage subgames with both ﬁrms or no ﬁrm revealing have already been
solved above. The case that A only develops the less important technology 2 is, as
































Figure 4: Comparison of equilibria under proprietary and open regime. (a):
Market structure. Proprietary regime: duopoly in X, monopoly in Y, Z. Open
regime: Duopoly in X, Y, monopoly in Z. (b): Product qualities. Border curve
given by aq(c), equation (27).
subgame are determined. Comparing the payoﬀs with those under the open regime and
the proprietary regime allows one to solve the second stage (choice between revealing
and secrecy) and then the entire game. The results are summarized in the following
Proposition, which is illustrated by Figure 5 and proved in Appendix A.7. The border
curves a4(c) and a5(c) of the shaded areas are described by equations (29) and (30).
Proposition 8 When the choice between revealing and secrecy is endogenous, an equi-
librium in which both ﬁrms enter the market, choose revealing, and develop only their
respectively more important technology exists under the following conditions:
(i) For low levels of competition and low to medium homogeneity in technology needs
(shaded area bottom left in (a,c) parameter space, Figure 5).
(ii) For strong competition and high homogeneity in technology needs (shaded area top
right in Figure 5).
In case (i), but not in case (ii), also a duopoly equilibrium with secrecy by both ﬁrms
exists.
To illustrate Proposition 8, Table 1 shows as a numerical example the various third-stage
subgame equilibria for the parameter values (a,c) = (0.2,0.2). Columns one/two and
ﬁve/six represent equilibria of the entire game, with quality and proﬁts being considerably
higher in the “revealing” than in the “secrecy” equilibrium. Columns three/four show
the outcome in case a ﬁrm deviates in stage two from one of the equilibria. When B
unilaterally deviates from “revealing” to “secrecy”, A can no longer adopt T2 from B














Figure 5: Endogenous revealing: Existence of equilibria with both ﬁrms
choosing to reveal (shaded areas).
chooses a development level of 0.4, far below what A can adopt from B when both reveal
(0.8). Due to complementarity between T1 and T2, A’s reduced level of T2 also reduces
its marginal beneﬁt of investing in T1, such that dA1 goes down as well, from 0.8 to 0.6.
Since B adopts this development, the same argument implies that also B’s incentives
to invest in T2 are reduced. However, this negative technology eﬀect is counteracted by
the positive competition eﬀect: by keeping dB2 secret, B avoids the negative competitive
eﬀect from A’s improved quality. In the example, the two eﬀects happen to cancel each
other out, such that dB1 remains at the level of 0.8. Still, also B’s quality is reduced
because of the decrease in dA1. Despite the fact that A’s quality is reduced far more and
competition from A is thus strongly reduced, proﬁts for B decrease from 0.64 to 0.576.
The last two columns show the subgame equilibrium when both ﬁrms have opted for
secrecy. Development levels, quality, and proﬁts are lower than when both reveal, while
costs are higher. Still, it constitutes an equilibrium since a unilateral deviation to “re-
vealing” would lower the respective ﬁrm’s payoﬀ even further, from 0.18 to 0.12.
A closer inspection of subgame equilibria in area II of parameter space (Figure 5) reveals
that they strongly diﬀer from those in area I. Their existence is not so much driven by
complementarity between A’s and B’s developments but by the fact that, under strong
competition, the cost of developing both technologies is too high (a duopoly with secrecy
by both ﬁrms would lead to negative proﬁts, see Figure 1). Despite the fact that these
equilibria are unexpected and even surprising, the following discussion focuses on area
I since it corresponds to the empirical setting at hand. Furthermore, monopoly proﬁts
in area II are so much larger than duopoly proﬁts that in real situations, a monopoly
17Revealing by both Revealing only by A Secrecy by both
A B A B A B
dX1 0.8 0† 0.6 0† 0.73 0.47
dX2 0† 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.47 0.73
QX 1.6 1.6 0.92 1.4 1.17 1.17
KX1 0.64 0.64 0.52 0.64 0.76 0.76
ΠX1 0.64 0.64 0.12 0.576 0.18 0.18
Table 1: Numerical example: Third-stage subgame equilibria for diﬀerent
actions in stage two for (a,c) = (0.2,0.2). † indicates that the respective
technology development is adopted from the competitor.
outcome seems far more likely.
5 Discussion
The model results correspond to observations made in the embedded Linux industry. To
start with, the prevalence of duopoly equilibria under the open regime (Propositions 6 and
7(i)) ﬁnds its empirical analogy in the fact that market entry into the embedded Linux
industry, and into open-source-based industries in general, is easier than entry under a
proprietary regime (cf. Gruber & Henkel 2005). A start-up in the ﬁeld of embedded Linux
can build upon the publicly available code (in the model: the developments of the other
ﬁrm) and just needs developments on top in order to diﬀerentiate its market oﬀering. In
contrast, a proprietary regime has a stronger tendency towards monopoly. The necessity
to develop not only diﬀerentiating product features, but also the basic product, makes
market participation more costly. A quote from an expert interview illustrates this:
“We can use the free software to focus our engineering eﬀort on what we sell. [...]
I would say that the biggest diﬃculty that a company like WindRiver and QNX
[vendors of proprietary embedded operating systems] has is that they have to do
that enormous amount of maintenance on many things that are not speciﬁc to their
product, but generic. [...] Our big investment is on areas where we believe we have
a competitive advantage on.” (Software vendor, US)
18Propositions 2 and 7(ii)—higher duopoly proﬁts under the open than under the propri-
etary regime—may or may not be surprising. It is plausible since, under the open regime,
each ﬁrm has to bear the development cost of only one technology, not both. Yet, the
availability of one’s developments for the competitor should reduce innovation incentives,
potentially to such a degree that proﬁts, despite cost savings on development, are lower
than under the proprietary regime. This is not the case, though—the incentive-reducing
eﬀect of free-riding is overcompensated by eﬃciency gains resulting from the avoidance of
parallel developments and higher returns to quality due to complementarity.
Propositions 1 and 7(iii) contain the ﬁrst central result: The open regime can yield
product qualities superior to those that obtain under the proprietary regime. The con-
dition for this result is that technology needs are suﬃciently heterogeneous (a small)
and/or the intensity c of competition is low. The result is driven by specialization and
complementarity between technologies. Since, under the open regime, A can adopt B’s
technology level dB2, which is superior to what A would have developed under the pro-
prietary regime, A’s marginal gain from investment in technology 1 is higher under the
open regime (provided competition is not too strong). The result holds in the area below
the downward-sloping curve shown in Figure 4b.
The above ﬁndings help to understand the fast technological development that embed-
ded Linux has experienced. The following quote from an expert interview concerning
proprietary embedded operating systems illustrates the ﬁndings from the model:
“In the next version [of the operating system] several new features were needed and
there was only one supplier—the vendor of the operating system. But when they get
to their limits, they have a problem. This can’t happen to you with Linux, because
no matter which new technology comes up you can be sure that within three to six
months the ﬁrst reference implementations are available—that is, much earlier than
a proprietary vendor can supply them.” (Software vendor, EU)
Also the second central result, concerning endogenous revealing, corresponds to em-
pirical observations. As pointed out in Section 2, ﬁrms engaged in embedded Linux
development do have a choice between revealing and protecting their developments, de-
spite the fact that Linux is OSS. Still, large amounts of code are voluntarily made public,
as the survey has shown (Henkel 2005).
Several modeling assumptions merit discussion. To start with, the coeﬃcient b of the
complementarity term in the ﬁrms’ quality functions was set to 1. It is hard to say if this
19value is “big” or “small” compared to real complementarity eﬀects in embedded Linux.
However, Propositions 1 to 3 have shown that the central results of the paper are valid
whenever b > 0. Hence, with small values of b (b < 1) the areas of parameter space where
the results hold will shrink, but not vanish.
More fundamental are the assumptions made on market structure. First, market entry
has been excluded. This is justiﬁed by the observation made in the qualitative study of
embedded Linux that competitive positions are protected more by complementary assets,
in particular hardware and scarce personnel, than by secrecy. This ﬁnding is consistent
with various studies on the appropriability of rents from innovation, which rank lead
time and complementary assets as more eﬀective mechanisms than secrecy (and as much
more eﬀective than legal protection mechanisms) (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson & Winter
1987, Harabi 1995, Cohen, Nelson & Walsh 2000, Arundel 2001). Hence, even though
the software is freely available, entrants can not easily replicate the incumbents’ market
position.
As market entry, also merging was excluded. Arguments for merging are economies
of scale and of scope, the latter resulting from knowledge spillovers between diﬀerent
research projects (as shown, e.g., by Henderson & Cockburn (1996) for the pharmaceutical
industry). However, under the open regime in my model, these advantages are realized by
an open exchange—merging is not required. Reducing competition remains as a motive
for merging, but is not too compelling given low intensity of competition. Furthermore, in
the real world the number N of ﬁrms is larger than two, and competition-related beneﬁts
from merging decrease in N. Hence, the historically grown fragmented market structure
in the ﬁeld of embedded Linux is preserved by the open regime, and the model assumption
is justiﬁed by the model itself.
The number of ﬁrms was set to two. One might conjecture that endogenous revealing
becomes less plausible when more ﬁrms (N) are in the market, since unilateral deviation
from “revealing” might then be less harmful to the respective player. However, while the
eﬀect that such deviation would have on each other ﬁrm decreases in N, the negative
repercussions on the deviating ﬁrm add up over all other ﬁrms. Hence, the phenomenon
of endogenous revealing is not likely to vanish for larger numbers of ﬁrms.
Finally, the possibility of licensing was not considered. In the particular case of em-
bedded Linux, this is correct since (per-unit) royalties are excluded by the applicable
open source license. More generally, the assumption is justiﬁed when the developments
under consideration are not big enough to make licensing worthwhile. Furthermore, de-
20vice manufacturers that develop embedded Linux to run on their hardware are not in the
business of licensing software (see von Hippel (1988, pp. 45-46) on the diﬃculties involved
in changing functional roles in the context of innovation).
6 Conclusions
The debate about the beneﬁts and drawbacks of intellectual property rights (IPRs) goes
back many decades and even centuries (Machlup & Penrose 1950, Arrow 1962). IPRs are
intended to increase appropriability of innovation rents and thus incentives to innovate
(e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer 2002). However, their impact on the diﬀusion of innovations
and on second-generation innovators is ambiguous. While they can facilitate markets
for technology (Arora, Fosfuri & Gambardella 2001), they can also restrict adoption and
further development of innovations. In addition, fragmentation of IPRs required for a
new product can lead to a “tragedy of the anticommons” with ineﬃciently low adoption
of innovations (Heller 1998). Given the high importance of spill-overs for overall economic
development (Romer 1990, Grossman & Helpman 1991), weaker IPRs may indeed fuel
innovation (Mazzoleni & Nelson 1998, Lessig 2001, Boldrin & Levine 2002). This is true in
particular for industries where innovation is strongly sequential, such as semiconductors
and software (Levin 1982, Farrell 1995, Bessen & Maskin 2000).
The present paper adds to this debate by exploring circumstances under which free
revealing of innovations is preferable to secrecy. It was found that if competition is not
too strong, technologies are complementary, and heterogeneity of technology needs is
medium or high, an open regime yields higher product qualities as well as higher proﬁts
than a proprietary regime. Also, even though a precise proof would require additional
assumptions, overall welfare is likely to be higher. Under the same conditions, when the
decision to reveal is endogenous, revealing by both players is an equilibrium. One might
have expected a prisoner’s dilemma where bilateral revealing is beneﬁcial for both players
but secrecy is individually rational. Such a situation is indeed prevalent in large parts
of the parameter space. However, for low intensity of competition and middle to high
values of technical heterogeneity, a coordination game arises: not only secrecy, but also
revealing by both players is an equilibrium. In the latter case, product qualities as well
as proﬁts are higher. Thus, under certain conditions not protection, but free revealing of
an innovation is the best way to appropriate rents from it.
It is plausible that ﬁrms in the embedded Linux industry are “used” to revealing due
21to the open source culture. Despite a certain latitude to keep developments secret, they
are aligned on the revealing equilibrium of the coordination game. Similar conditions as
in embedded Linux with respect to heterogeneous technology needs and complementarity
between technologies exist also in other industries, especially in other segments of the
software market. Examples are middleware and webserver software. The reason why
nonetheless in many instances informal, open collaboration does not exist might be that
the relevant actors are trapped in a proprietary equilibrium and lack a mechanism to
achieve coordination on revealing.
The innovation process that could be identiﬁed was dubbed the “jukebox mode of
innovation” since it is made up from complementary and heterogeneous contributions,
just like the choices of music made at a jukebox. The model was developed to capture the
essence of this innovation process. It should contribute to the understanding of innovation
processes driven by voluntary spillovers.
22A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Under the open regime, since qB1 ≡ qA1 because of adoption of T1 by B, the symmetric






= 0 . (9)
Note that due to assumption 2 (additive separability of ΠA) the above partial derivatives
do not depend on T2 being developed in-house or adopted from B (as is the case here).
Under the proprietary regime, the symmetric Nash equilibrium is characterized by qA1 =
qB2 = q
prop





= 0 , (10)
∂ΠA
∂qA2
= 0 . (11)
Due to concavity of ΠA, these equations deﬁne curves ¯ qA1(qA2) (10) and ¯ qA2(qA1) (11) the
intersection of which yields the sought-for equilibrium. Implicit diﬀerentiation allows to























The positive signs follow from assumptions 3 and 7 (concavity and complementarity).
If the intensity c of competition is zero, the partial derivative w.r.t. qB1 vanishes in
equation (9), and equation (10)—deﬁning the curve ¯ qA1—is fulﬁlled at the “open” Nash
equilibrium. That is, the curve ¯ qA1(qA2) runs through the equilibrium point (qopen,qopen).
If technology needs are heterogeneous (a < 1), then by deﬁnition of heterogeneity,
∂ΠA/∂qA2 < ∂ΠA/∂qA1 = 0 at (qopen,qopen). Due to concavity of ΠA, this implies that
equation (11) (deﬁning the curve ¯ qA2) is, for qA1 = qopen, fulﬁlled for some qA2 < qopen.
That is, the curve ¯ qA2(qA1) runs “below” the open equilibrium point.
23Taking the above two paragraphs together and considering that both ¯ qA1 and ¯ qA2 have a









A2 < qopen. This point may be a corner solution. For reasons of continuity, these
inequalities also hold for all c in some suitably chosen interval [0,¯ c[ with ¯ c > 0.
(ii) If b = 0, then the curves ¯ qA1 and ¯ qA2 have zero slope (see (12) and (13)). That is, in
a (qA1,qA2) coordinate system, ¯ qA1 is a vertical straight line and ¯ qA2 a horizontal straight
line. Hence, in the absence of competition (c = 0), the qA1 coordinate of the open and the
proprietary equilibrium are identical since ¯ qA1(qA2) runs through both points. If c > 0,
then ∂ΠA/∂qB1 < 0 in (9) and thus ∂ΠA/∂qA1 > 0, which implies qopen < ¯ qA1(qopen) ≡
¯ qA1(q
prop
A2 ) ≡ q
prop
A1 . 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Starting with A’s proﬁt in the open regime’s equilibrium, the following chain of inequalities













































A1 ) − KA1(q
prop
A1 ) − KA2(q
prop
A2 ) (18)
Inequality (15) holds since it implies A’s deviating from its equilibrium action qopen
to q
prop
A1 . The following inequality (16) holds since revenues increase in the ﬁrm’s own
technology levels and q
prop
A2 < qopen for c < ¯ c. Equality (17) holds since, for c = 0, B’s
technology levels do not inﬂuence A’s proﬁts. Inequality (18) is obvious. The last line
shows A’s proﬁt in the proprietary equilibrium. This proves that, for c = 0, equilibrium
proﬁts are larger in the open than in the proprietary equilibrium. For reasons of continuity,
this statement is also true for all c in some suitable chosen interval [0,˜ c[ with ˜ c > 0. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
It needs to be shown that, under suitable parameter values, unilateral deviating in stage
2 of the four-stage game from “open” to “proprietary” is not proﬁtable. That is, if A
24chooses “proprietary” while B chooses “open” in stage 2 (“semi-open regime“, sor), then
A’s payoﬀ in the ensuing subgame equilibrium of stages 3 and 4 is lower than its payoﬀ
in the subgame equilibrium that follows a choice of “open” by both players.
Given the above, A has three options in stage 3: develop both T1 and T2, develop T1
and adopt T2 from B, or adopt both T1 and T2 from B. B, on the other hand, can not
adopt any technology from A and will hence choose to develop both technologies (possibly
with qBi = 0 if costs are too high).
The ﬁrst option, to develop both T1 and T2 inhouse and adopt nothing from B, yields
in the ﬁnal stage a situation identical to that in the proprietary regime. The resulting
proﬁt for A has been shown in Proposition 2 to be lower than that in the open regime if
c is suﬃciently low.
To discuss the second option, I ﬁrst show that qsor
B2 < qopen if c = 0, a < 1, and b > 0.
This is true because at c = 0 the semi-open regime for B is identical to the proprietary
regime (no incoming knowledge spill-overs, while outgoing spillovers are irrelevant for B’s
proﬁts), and q
prop
B2 < qopen has been shown in Proposition 1(i). Then, starting with A’s




































Inequality (20) holds since it implies A’s deviating from its subgame equilibrium action
qopen to qsor
A1 . Equality (21) holds since, for c = 0, B’s technology levels do not inﬂuence
A’s proﬁts. The following inequality (22) holds since revenues increase in the ﬁrm’s own
technology levels and qsor
B2 < qopen for c = 0. The last line shows A’s proﬁt in the “semi-
open” subgame equilibrium. This proves the proposition (given option 2) for c = 0. For
reasons of continuity, this statement is also true for all c in some suitable chosen interval
[0,ˆ c[ with ˆ c > 0.
Finally, the third option (to adopt both technologies from B) can be shown to yield
lower proﬁts than the open equilibrium when heterogeneity is high enough. Consider
that, if c = 0 and a = 0, B will only develop T2 in the semi-open regime. Then, since
∂ΠA/∂qA2 = 0 if a = 0 (see Assumption 6), spill-overs from B regarding T2 are irrelevant
25for A. Hence, in order to realize positive proﬁts, A has to develop T1 in-house. For
reasons of continuity, in-house development of T1 is more attractive than full free-riding
also for suﬃciently small positive values of homogeneity a (a < ˆ a). In turn, as shown
in the preceding paragraph, a semi-open regime with in-house development of T1 and
adoption of T2 from B is inferior to an open regime for suﬃciently small values of c. 
A.4 Third-Stage Subgame Equilibria under the Open Regime
Given decisions on market entry and choice of technology, Nash equilibria for development
levels are calculated in the standard manner. One can show that the matrix of second
order derivatives of the proﬁt functions is negatively deﬁnite, which means that the ﬁrst
order conditions do indeed identify maxima of the proﬁt functions. Since the latter are
quadratic functions of the variable, maxima are unique. The resulting actions dAi of ﬁrm
A in each subgame equilibrium are given in Table 2. The corresponding actions of ﬁrm
B obtain from symmetry considerations. Cases where a ﬁrm chooses dXi = 0 and adopts
dY i from its competitor (i.e., qXi = dY i are indicated by † resp. ‡ in Table 2). It should
be noted that, when A develops both technologies and B none, the expression for dA2
becomes negative for a < (3c − 1)/(2 − c + c2) (see equation 23 and Figure 6a). In this
case the given expressions are to be replaced by dA2 = 0 and dA1 = (1 − ac)/2.
From the subgame equilibrium actions given in Table 2 payoﬀs can be calculated. They
are given, for ﬁrm A, in Table 3.
A.5 Second-Stage Subgame Equilibria under the Open Regime
Given the payoﬀs obtained by solving the game’s third and ﬁnal stage (see Table 3), the
second-stage subgame’s equilibria can be determined. The case that only one ﬁrm has
entered the market in stage one is identical to the monopoly case under the proprietary
regime, with equilibrium development levels given by (5) and payoﬀs by (6). In the
following, market entry by both ﬁrms is assumed and best responses by ﬁrm A to all
possible actions by ﬁrm B are determined. Details of the proofs are omitted in order to
simplify the presentation. They are available from the author upon request.
A’s best response to no development by B: If A develops only T1, it receives the payoﬀ
(1−ac)2/4 ≥ 0. This implies that development of T1 is always superior to no development
(the limiting case a = c = 1 is not analyzed further). Development of T1 is superior to
26development of T1 and T2 if (see Figure 6a)
a < a1(c) :=
3c − 1
2 − c + c2 . (23)
A’s best response to development of T2 by B: It can be shown that development of T1
is, for all parameter values, superior to both no development and development of T1 and
T2.
A’s best response to development of T1 and T2 by B: It can be shown that development
of T1 is always superior to development of T1 and T2. In addition, one can prove that
development of T1 is superior to no development if and only if (see Figure 6b)
a < a2(c) :=
−306 + 72c − 1432c2 − 416c3 + 214c4 − 96c5 + 68c6 + 8c7 + 4
√
V
2(63 − 324c + 190c2 − 310c3 − 249c4 + 124c5 + 4c6 + 6c7)
, (24)
where






Actions by ﬁrm Actions by A in stage two
A in third-stage no development T1 T1, T2
subgame equil. dA1 dA2 dA1 dA2 dA1 dA2




































Table 2: Open Regime: Equilibrium actions of ﬁrm A in each subgame equi-
librium of stage three, when both ﬁrms have entered the market, depending
on technology choices made in stage two. † indicates that qA2 = dB2 > 0; ‡
indicates that qA1 = dB1 > 0.
27Payoﬀs Actions by A in stage two











































Table 3: Open Regime: Payoﬀ matrix for ﬁrm A in second-stage subgame





























Figure 6: Open regime: Best responses by A to (a) no development by B; (b)
development of T1 and T2 by B as functions of the parameters a, c. Border










The curves a1 (23) and a2 (24) divide the (a,c) parameter space into four areas. Analysis
of the best responses above shows that development of T1 by A is always a best response
to development of T2 by B, and vice versa. Hence, a symmetric subgame equilibrium with
each ﬁrm developing only one technology always exists. Development of both technologies
by one ﬁrm and no development by its competitor is an equilibrium if a > a1(c) and
28a > a2(c) (see Figure 2).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 7
It must be shown how the areas in parameter space that are relevant in Proposition 7 are
deﬁned. Two of the limiting curves have already been calculated. The areas where, under
the proprietary regime, a duopoly/monopoly obtains as equilibrium are separated by the
curve cb(a), see equation (4) and Figure 1. The corresponding curve for the open regime
is described by equation (23).
The curve separating the areas in parameter space where total duopoly proﬁts under
the open regime are lower/higher than monopoly proﬁts under the proprietary regime
obtains by setting the relevant terms (see (6) and (7)) equal to each other and solving
for a. This leads to the following equation (where the ± symbol indicates that the curve
consists of two connected branches):
ap(c) =
5 + 5c2 − 8c + 6c3 ±
√
45 + 48c − 150c2 − 276c3 − 99c4 + 60c5 + 36c6
2(8c + c2 + 1)
. (26)
The curve separating the areas where product qualities are higher under the respective
regimes (see Figure 4b) is calculated by inserting the equilibrium technology levels into
the equations (1), which describe product qualities. One obtains
aq(c) =
−2 − 40c − 20c2 + 6
√
9 + 26c + 29c2 + 16c3 + 4c4
2(8 + 25c + 8c2)
. (27)
A.7 Proof of Proposition 8
The ﬁnal-stage subgame equilibria for the case that only ﬁrm A reveals its developments
are determined by standard calculus. The resulting actions and payoﬀs are given in tables
4 and 5, respectively.
The payoﬀs given in Table 5 allow to determine the players’ best responses. As under
the open regime, A’s best response to no development by B is development of T1 when
a < a1(c), and development of both technologies when a > a1(c). See equation (23).
A’s best response to development of T2 as well as to development of both technologies
29Actions Technologies ﬁrm A
in subgame T1 T1, T2















































Table 4: Endogenous revealing: Actions in ﬁnal-stage subgame equilibrium
when only ﬁrm A reveals, depending on technology choices made in stage three.
† indicates that B adopts the respective development from A.
Proﬁts in sub- Technologies ﬁrm A






















ΠB = (9+8a−8c+2c2−8ca−8ca2 (34a−32c−68ac+12c2+2c3+40ac2−56a2c
7c2a+c3−c2a2+2c3a) +13a2+12a2c2+4ac3−2a2c3+25)




























Table 5: Endogenous revealing: Payoﬀs in ﬁnal-stage subgame equilibrium





































Figure 7: Revealing only by A: Parameter areas of diﬀerent best-response
functions in technology choices (a) and diﬀerent third-stage subgame equilibria
(b).
by B is always to develop both technologies. B’s best response to development of both
technologies by A: As in the open regime, B’s best response is “no development” and
adoption of both of A’s technologies if a > a2(c), and development of T2 if a < a2(c).
See equation (24). B’s best response to development of T1 by A is either development
of T2 or development of T1 and T2. Development of T2 is preferable if a < a3(c), see
equation (28). Figure 7a shows the three curves that separate areas of diﬀerent best
response functions in parameter space, as well as the resulting seven segments a-g.
a < a3(c) :=
16 − 64c + 40c2 + 12c3 + 4
√
192 + 96c + 396c2 + 288c3 + 216c4 + 78c5 + 9c6
2(32 + 64c + 8c2)
(28)
The curves a1(c), a2(c) and a3(c) divide the parameter space into seven segments. The
best-response functions allow to determine the third-stage subgame equilibria for each
segment. In segments a and f, development of both technologies by A and no development
by B is the only equilibrium. In segments b, c, d, and g, development of both technologies
by A and development of T2 by B is the unique equilibrium. In segment e, no equilibrium
in pure strategies exists. Figure 7b shows which subgame equilibrium arises in each part
of parameter space.
Finally, the payoﬀs that B receives in the third-stage subgame when only A has chosen
to reveal (see Table 5) have to be compared to those under the open regime (see Table 3)
in order to solve the second stage of the game. I ﬁrst consider areas in parameter space
where, when only A has chosen to reveal, B chooses “no development” (i.e., a > a3(c),
see Figure 7). Setting B’s payoﬀs equal to what the ﬁrm receives under the open regime
















Figure 8: Comparison of B’s payoﬀs for third-stage subgame equilibria when
both reveal vs. when only A reveals. Revealing by both is preferable for B
between the curves a4 and a5.
open regime than with unilateral secrecy:
a < a4(c) :=
−8 + 4c − 20c2 − 2c3 + 2c5 + 2
√
V
2(5 − 13c − 3c2 − 2c3 + c5)
, where (29)









In case B chooses to develop T2 in the third-stage subgame equilibrium when only A
reveals (i.e., for a < a3(c)), B’s payoﬀs under the open regime equal those when only A
reveals if
a = a5(c) :=
2 − 12c + 78c2 + 40c3 − 20c4 ± 4
√
W
2(13 + 6c − 63c2 − 30c3 + 8c4 − 2c5)
, where (30)











Since the function a5(c) is deﬁned piecewise, the condition for the open regime to be
preferable for B cannot be formulated as “a greater ...”. Instead, Figure 8 shows the
corresponding areas in parameter space. The open regime yields a higher payoﬀ for B
for parameter values (a,c) between the curves a4 and a5 (except for the triangle top right
where a1(c) > a > a2(c) and no equilibrium exists). Hence, for these values “revealing by
both ﬁrms” is a second-stage subgame equilibrium.
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